Monday, 8 April 2024

Sex difference is aesthetics - appeals to biology are reasonable but do not do, finally


It's impossible for certain behaviors, mannerisms, personalities, or preferences to not "match" your sex. To believe otherwise is regressive, sexist, pseudoscientific nonsense.


What science tells us about sex difference is important. But science is not self-legitimating.

It provides information to support that there is a stable reproduction through generations of two kinds of human, which are called male and female.

But awareness of sex difference is prior to any science account. I think it is a basis for the faculty of reasoning per se.

Awareness that our bodies give us reproductive potential is fundamental, and we cannot but be affected by that awareness. It strikes me that cultures of how we present ourselves were always co-present with awareness of reproductive potential.

I don’t think there is a culture of presentation in other primates. But pairing occurs, and there is competition between males and females.

I notice I just used the words that denote the human types with these different potentialities for sexual reproduction.

But I don’t see gonads, or chromosomes or distinct things, I see a complete individual here and a complete individual there and I note differences and associate the differences with reproductive potential, which I might share.


Friday, 17 December 2021

Kathleen Stock on LBC Iain Dale programme - amazing courage and self-control

Listen to the interview and audience Q&A with Kathleen Stock on this programme (17th December 2021).

I can’t image the pressure she must be under. Not only has she to live up to the normal pressure of expectation of women, to be kind and empathic, but she must also maintain self-control and calm and patience in conversation with opponents, conversations which are invariably already up to ‘10’ in emotion, stating again what is obviously true, that sex is real and binary (notwithstanding very few cases of difference of sexual development) and is important to how we socially organise.

Iain Dale and LBC have been brilliant in enabling this discussion to take place in public.


https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=nix3ZB5ZBd8


https://t.co/FMBlg1pl8E

Sunday, 24 October 2021

Sex-based protections in UK law - a dialogue with someone who would abolish them (FULL TEXT)

Re-posting blogpost on 24th October 2021

Below, I have reproduced my March 2020 blogpost, now as a continuous piece of text (whereas I previously had screenshots of a transcript of an on-line exchange of messages).


_______________________________________________________________

Between 3rd and 7th March 2020, I was in a long online exchange with someone in response to Suzanne Moore’s Guardian article ‘Women must have the right to organise’ (2nd March 2020)

I was (am) on side of upholding sex-based protections in UK Equality Act 2010.

‘Abi’ (name changed), a self-described ‘intersectional feminist’*, took the view that sex is thoroughly socially constructed, and that the business of classification of individuals by sex is patriarchy** (and patriarchy is misogyny).

Our exchange began when I quoted Suzanne Moore from her article: “The latest silencing of women is a warning. You either protect women’s rights as sex-based or you don’t protect them at all“, to which ‘Abi’ replied: ““Sex based rights” is silly.”

What developed was as in-depth a conversation I have had with someone of opposing views, extending over 200+ replies.

I am posting because some readers might find interesting.

It’s a 20-minute read.

(Acknowledgement: I quote below from writing by Dr Jane Clare Jones) 

*The link at ‘intersectional’ is to an academic paper by US social theorist Dr Kimberle Crenshaw from 1991. Crenshaw is credited with having introduced ‘intersectionality’ as a tool or technique of social analysis, in which attention is drawn to individuals’ circumstances and the ‘intersections’ of ‘axes’ of their social existence through which the individual can experience discrimination and oppression. The ‘axes’ are sex, race, class.

**For many, ‘Patriarchy’ is synonymous with Misogyny. If ‘Patriarchy’ is regarded as a ‘dominance hierarchy’, then this is already saying the same thing. I don’t see that it must be regarded this way.

Guardian 2nd March 2020 carries an article by Suzanne Moore, ‘Women must have the right to organise.We will not be silenced.’

DIALOGUE:

AverageProtestant: <Thumbs Up> “The latest silencing of women is a warning. You either protect women’s rights as sex-based or you don’t protect them at all.”

Abi: “Sex based rights” is silly. There are no sex-based rights beyond the right NOT to be limited from full participation in society on the basis of sex. There are no Mullerian Duct based rights. There are no gametic rights. No gene-based rights. You’re talking eugenics.

AP: Protections are already afforded on grounds of a person’s sex, yes. Full participation in society; no discrimination on grounds of a person’s sex. Quite right. Protections won’t survive elimination of ‘sex’ as a political category. Not silly.

Abi: How does this follow? Once you stop centring reproduction as the seat of identity, you stop motivating society to organize itself around reproductive roles. It’s be the single most destabilizing blow against patriarchy we could ever land.

AP: Sex is given and a condition of identity; if that is what you mean by ‘seat’, then I find the proposal that we ‘stop centring’ it (sex) unintelligible.

Abi: That “given” is precisely the bioessentialism that keeps us trapped in a patriarchal framework. We could choose to organize society where reproductive configuration was incidental to personhood, not definitional. Patriarchal society merely *appears* inevitable. It’s not.

AP: I do not reduce identity to biology (if that’s what you mean by ‘bioessentialism’), but I do say that sex is a condition of identity. Another condition is other people, e.g. one’s primary care-givers. Perhaps write a book to help us imagine the society you wish to bring about?

Abi: Or perhaps I can share my ideas here. (1) Yours, and 99.9% of the world’s problem, is the foundational patriarchal belief Sex MUST be a condition of identity. (2) Til you can fathom how this may NOT be so for all ppl, you will only ever perceive sex nonconformity as a threat.

[There followed an exchange with a third person, in which Abi drew a distinction between ‘sex nonconformity’ and ‘gender nonconformity’.]

Abi: Refusing to accept sex as the condition of identity IS sex nonconformity, regardless of masculinity or femininity. Insisting reproductive configuration dictates identity is not just sex conformity, it’s conformity to patriarchy itself.

AP: (Your first sentence) I see the distinction you draw, but again, ‘refusing to accept’ what *conditions* the refusing Agent I find un-intelligible.

AP (continuing): (Your second sentence) As my earlier tweet, I believe sex is a condition of identity but does not ‘dictate’ identity (what I think you mean by ‘bioessentialism’) and is not the only condition of identity (another being other people).

Abi: Do you accept there is a difference between knowing patriarchy centers around our reproductive function and believing that it is objectively correct and natural to do so? If so, there is hope for continued discussion.

AP: I accept there may be such a difference for someone who has this knowledge. However, I dispute any claim to such knowledge, not least because it is such a stupendous claim (it is mythic), but also, as above, I don't believe identity is reducible to sex, but is conditioned by sex.

AP (continuing): Even if someone did have this knowledge, if they then concluded that ‘It is natural and correct’ would be a value judgement, in favour of a certain vision or form of life. What other vision or form of life would show this judgement to be faulty?

Abi: “These body parts exist therefore the people who have them must constitute a specific class of person who is conditioned by having those parts in the universally predictable ways”. That is an extraordinary claim to knowledge.

AP: “These body parts”… group in stable combinations in individuals. That is not an extraordinary claim, but an empirical claim. As individuals how can it fail to affect us (even condition us) if the combination we have means we are capable of gestating young.

Abi: You think it is impossible to know that patriarchy centres our identities around sex?   

AP: I believe sex is a condition of human life, individually and societally, and not a construct of it. As above, I don't believe sex determines identity but is a condition of identity, another being other people. I believe identity is neither fixed no single, but changeable and plural.

Abi: And I believe we have all internalised deeply patriarchal ways of thinking about sex, especially its boundaries, its limits, and its universality and primacy on the formation of identity. That you believe identity is not fixed or singular gives you common cause with trans people. Good.

AP: ‘… ways of thinking’… . If Patriarchy is the Christian cultural inheritance, I agree, categories of thought are shaped by it. I can't dispense with them anymore than I can my culture. I am not atheist, where an atheist might feel themselves to have escaped these categories.

Abi: Nobody escapes learning cultural biases. It is all internalised on some level and must be actively unlearned before anyone can claim to have achieved any distance from it. US atheists may not be religious but will still have acquired a lot of cultural Christianity.  

AP: Indeed, though I would distinguish between ‘cultural bias’ and ‘categories of thought’. ‘… must be actively unlearned …’.  Yes, and to be replaced with what? (Did you mean ‘us’ or ‘US’ (United States)?)

Abi: United States, by way of example, sorry. The replacement is up to us. It behoves us first to look, in our own culture, and across known civilizations. We begin to see a lot of variation in embodied identification when we do.  

AP: ‘The replacement is up to us’. In the UK a concrete proposal to replace what has been ‘unlearned’ is to instantiate ‘gender identity’ in law, e.g. as a ‘protected characteristic’. Proponents of ‘gender self-identification’ pose gender identity as innate, such that it can be possible for this ‘identity’ to be in conflict with the person’s sex, thus ‘trans people’. I don't believe in innate gender identity. As my earlier tweet, I believe identity is changeable and plural.

AP: If you agree with my stance on identity as changeable and plural, then I expect you also agree there is no innate ‘gender identity’?

Abi: I think the innateness of gender identity, whether it exists or not, is irrelevant and I do not believe the laws will constitute that it must be so.

Abi: Do people have the right to claim ownership of their own bodies, lives and identities? Do people have a right to alter, reclaim or outright reject sex-based identities conferred at birth? Is defining other people’s bodies by their most private body parts, and enforcing their public identities accordingly, morally or ethically defensible? These I believe are the relevant areas of the law. Not people’s inner beliefs. Not people’s collective comfort with the idea of trans people. As for my own beliefs about gender identity, I have no strong opinion about its truth or fiction. The self-knowledge of others is not knowable. My ex-husband gave me no reason to believe his identity as a man was a fiction for himself, in spite of his female designation at birth. Neither did the material reality of our life together lead me to believe our life as husband and wife was illegitimate. We lived as man and wife because that's what we were. Your feelings about us claiming that are entirely your own to deal with.  

Abi: I don't think it is necessary to believe in gender identity or disbelieve in it. I define gender identity as basic self-awareness of one’s own body, how it is perceived by others, and how we feel about how it's perceived, tempered by what our bodies would read as if we had a choice. By that standard everybody has some sort of gender identity. And it's a standard that is far more common among transfolx than the ‘gendered soul’ stereotype you hold out as a core belief of trans politics (it’s not).

AP: Stonewall UK, for example, claim ‘gender identity’ to be ‘innate’. Construe that as a gendered soul if you wish. (Screenshot from Stonewall UK website, glossary of terms).



Abi: This is not a universal belief of trans people but Even so, I fail to see why it matters if some people believe in this. It is neither provable nor disprovable. Self-knowledge is only knowable to the South. It's not for you to intervene just because you disagree.

AP: If that is so, then I expect there are ramifications, for example in terms of medical treatments for gender dysphoria.

Abi: Yes, there are standards of care and guidelines for treatment, if varying a lot within and across countries. They’ve evolved from a previous era of gatekeeping and enforced stereotypes. Trans people fought like hell for the informed consent model and fight to expand it.

AP: Per my earlier tweets, I don't believe there can be an ‘innate’ ‘gender identity’, but prominent UK advocates, for example Stonewall UK, seek to instantiate it in law as a protected characteristic. I don't understand how ‘identity’ or ‘gender identity’ can be a ‘characteristic’.

(Screenshot, Stonewall UK submission to UK Parliament Women and Equalities Select Commission on Transgender Equality)



AP: In UK law presently, provision is made to exclude transgender persons from single sex spaces in certain circumstances.

Abi: I think that's shitty and dangerous, but it sounds like you have what you already want. How does a law that makes it a little less awful administratively for trans people to get their documents in order affect you in anyway?

AP: I support the campaign to have that legal provision upheld, yes. Here you present this as a matter of administration, a minor change. But earlier you referred to this change as ‘the single most destabilising blow against patriarchy we could ever land’.

Abi: I referred to the abolition of enforcing sex-based identities in the long term, not one particular law that is limited in its scope. It's the enforcement of sex that is the work of patriarchy and the trap for all of us.

AP: Ending this provision, which recognises sex as a political category, in this particular law is entailed by the wider project to end what you call the ‘enforcement of sex’. I opposed the smaller project as I oppose the wider project because sex is given and a condition of human society.

Abi: If sex is a ‘given’, it is private health information at its most relevant and none of anybody's business at its least relevant, like in 99.9% of our daily public interactions.

AP: If ‘gender identity’ is irrelevant then what grounds can there be for framing a law around ‘gender self-identification’ or that names ‘gender identity’ a protected characteristic?

Abi: That people have a right to express, claim and live their beliefs and the non-belief of others is no reason to stop them from doing so?

AP: But the question is what others are to do in respect of a persons declared identity. It may be argued that there is an ethical obligation to recognise a person’s declared identity. I would argue, not if that recognition is coerced.

Abi: Do people have the right to claim ownership of their own bodies, lives and identities? Do people have a right to alter, reclaim and or outright reject sex-based identities as confirmed at birth?

AP: ‘Ownership’ implies something fixed, which is owned. Per my earlier tweets, I believe identity is not fixed but changeable and, in some sense, an ongoing negotiation with other people, i.e., relational.

Abi: So, your body is not your own to claim and inhabit as you see fit if you apply an identity to it? Huh?

AP: The issue is now being forced. If gender identity is written into law as a protected characteristic, as some UK advocacy groups seek, then it will be necessary to believe it or else risk breaking the law. I don't think people have a ‘right’ to ‘live their identities’. Per my earlier tweets, I believe identity is a negotiation between people, as seems to have been so, from your prior tweet, in your relationship with your ex-husband.

Abi: It was not a negotiation. It was a lived reality. He was my husband. Legally. Socially. Factually. In every possible way, well beyond what could ever be anybody else’s business to know about us. But there are people who would love to strike that off the books. They don't get to.

Abi: You don't need to believe in same-sex marriage to accept that gay people can marry and have legal rights as married people. You don't need to believe non-whites are equal to whites to accept that they have the same rights of citizenship.

AP: Okay, I took the term believe from your preceding tweet. I will replace it with the word acccept I don't accept gender identity as a human characteristic as I do acccept sex.

Abi: I don't accept Jesus as my Lord and saviour. And?

AP: I think that’s the correct analogy: gender identity is in my view an object of faith, a matter of belief, and it could be protected as such. It is not, in my view, a characteristic.

Abi: Maybe not, but neither is Sex in society as it functions today. For sex to be as knowable and relevant and readily apparent as you claim it to be, we'd all have to be crowning in labour 24 /7.

AP: ‘Sex in society as it functions in society today’… How is it different to yesterday? (I’m not clear. Are you now referring to ‘sex’ as in the act?)

Abi: Sex as a public legal and social identity functions differently in the modern era relative to history. The entire idea of discrete biological sexes that must be segregated in all possible categorizations is the function of a particular societies, not a universal human condition.

Abi: What about sex is so much more knowable than gender identity in a practical sense? Genitals? That's only one aspect of sex. Who is my vagina any of your business? How do people know to call me a woman without confirming my sex first?

AP: ‘What about sex is so much more knowable than gender identity in a practical sense?’ I find the question unintelligible. I think only a person could pose it, who already regards sex as a kind of ‘writing on the body’, as ‘gender’ is linguistic. That is a disputable ontology.

Abi: Nah. When you see somebody you think to call a woman, it isn't because you saw her vagina or her ovaries or chromosomes. You got the idea from the way she looks and presents herself and when that presentation is ambiguous you aren't conducting medical interventions about it.

AP: ‘You get the idea from the way she looks and presents herself…’ – implies the presentation conforms to a gender norm (‘woman’).

Abi:  Explain how you come to the conclusion the people you meet and interact with are of a particular sex without relying on what they appear to your eye (gender presentation).

AP: I don't. Of course, I rely on appearances to reach such a conclusion.

Abi: That's all any of us ever use. The question is, how much is it our business to go around policing other people who don't match up to what we expect to see? My position is that's none of our business at all.

AP:  Equally, how much is it our business to oblige others to recognise or accept our view of ourselves, however earnestly we hold it? My position is it's not a right.

Abi: There are practical, legal and ethical limits to how much your personal opinion on somebody else’s anatomy can weigh on that person. And those limits are nowhere near “I should decide on what you call yourself, how you live, where you pee”. Bodily autonomy means just that. Sorry.

Abi: What your movement, however, is working towards, is a world where people whose sex is perceived by others as unambiguous or incongruent, can be compelled to disclose or outright reveal intimate details about their own bodies for the sake of the perceiver’s comfort. This would be a world that perforce constructs strict parameters for what is and is not acceptable for how women are allowed to look. A world where the perceivers of women's bodies hold all the leverage in respect to the access rights people classifiable to people are allowed [sic]. And that is just plain old patriarchy.

AP: ‘Perceived by others as ambiguous or incongruent…’ - Like your earlier tweet, implies a gender norm, in this case not-conformed-to. So taking you're two preceding tweets together, I find your approach wants both presentational norms for classification 'woman' and 'man' and that classification 'woman'/'man' is independent of presentation, namely according only to gender self-declaration. Which is it to be? If the latter, then woman or man is meaningless; if the former then there is policing of gender presentation.

Abi: I'm not convinced the categories are terribly meaningful, but as long as we, as a society, are forcing people to live in public and legal identities as either men or women, we ought to trust them to know which side they wish to do it on and what they need to do with themselves to get there.

AP: Evidently, ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ have had meaning for you. But how can these terms retain meaning if ‘man’ and ‘woman’ don't have meaning? I find no consistency in valuing such culturally-inscribed categories (identities, even) as ‘husband’ and ‘wife’, while seeking to abolish the concepts that comprise their meaning.

[At this point, and at others, I am aware of some criticisms of Judith Butler, along lines that JB theory - crudely, 'gender is product of power/discourse' - (a) gives no place for an Agent to intentionally disrupt gender norm and (b) provides no basis, once indeterminacy is established, for differentiating between what is subversion and what is conformity - every repetition is equally strange (or normal). Screenshot is extract from Wenjuan XIE (2014) Queer[ing] Performativity, Queer[ing] Subversions: A Critique of Judith Butler’s Theory of Performativity, Comparative Literature: East & West, 20:1, 18-39, DOI: 10.1080/25723618.2014.12015486 ]



Abi: They meant plenty to us. Doesn't mean they had to mean the exact same thing you mean when you use them. Why do you require lockstep consensus on the definitions for socially constructed terminologies?

AP: Even conventionally, there is no ‘exact same thing’, in terms of what we mean when we use these or any terms, and I don't require it. But you seem confident to allow that ‘man’ is not meaningful, yet ‘husband’ is (or will remain so even if ‘man’ does not).

Abi: I didn't say it wasn't meaningful to individuals. I don't think man woman or sex is all that usable as an organised in classes but since we have them, we may as well let people inhabit them in the ways they need rather than enforcing arbitrary, highly invasive parameters of biology.

AP: But how can anything have meaning, or lack of it, that is not meaningful to individuals? Individuals is what there are!

Abi: I said it was meaningful to individuals. I'm saying it's not terribly meaningful as a discrete principle for organising society by biology, At least not positively meaningful when enforced in that manner. In other words, it's great that there are men and women and it's great that people are able to live as such if they feel that's where they belong. It is not so great when you are forcing people to identify as such or are actively preventing them from doing so based on shit that's none of your business.

AP: ‘A discrete principle for organising society’ can have meaning only for an individual, or else it has no meaning.

Abi: *sigh* - This is reaching Stock levels of circular nonsense. Unenforceable criteria based on biology we will never normally access from each other cannot be a fair standard for organising society. This is too complicated, and need be belaboured. “Men and women exist”: that's reasonable and fair.

“I am the arbiter of who gets to be a man and who gets to be a woman”, not so much.

“I demand you prove you've met my criteria for womanhood, private citizen!”, even less so.

AP: I think you ran into a self-. contradiction that has made things complicated for you.

Abi: I'm just not articulating myself well at the moment. This isn't the best forum for discussion this complex. Are you ready to move on yet because life is waiting and I can either go live it or I can have this endless yet in direct conversation about other people’s biology.

AP: It is a very difficult topic to discuss. I think we can agree how central is the need of meaning.

Abi: Beliefs are not legislatable. Conduct is. You can believe all you like that non-Christians are going to Hell, but that doesn't give you the right to put to shout “terrorist” at Muslims. Nor address your  Wiccan co-worker as heathen in the office. Be civil to trans people and you'll be fine.

AP: Agreed. And I am. I am comfortable with gender identity as a belief. Beliefs are already a protected characteristic in the UK quality act trouble is, as per earlier tweets, GI advocates say it is innate and explicitly not a belief.

Abi: 1. how does this affect your life in any meaningful way? 2. What makes your situation so much more dire than everywhere else that has seen self ID already, for years? 3. if gender identity now exists as a political category, so what? If you didn't believe in homosexuality and think gays are merely confused, you could still do so. You just can't fire them or discriminate on that basis. How is this different with trans people and gender identity?

AP: For ‘How does this affect you’, I link you to the Womans Place UK wesbsite, which explains the potential consequences of GRA 2004 reform for women and women-only spaces, and other potential impacts. TLDR Because it impacts on ‘sex’ as a protected characteristic.   

Abi: Please provide a source that is not blatantly involved in distorting basic facts about trans people’s lives, bodies and challenges to render anti-trans sentiment more sympathetic.

AP: You ask, ‘If gender identity now exists as a political category, so what?’ I hope this answers your question. (Equality Act 2010, Protected characteristics, Sex)

Equ. Act 2010, PT. 16: INTERPRETATION, Section 212: General Interpretation.

(1)    In this Act

(2)    “man” means a male of any age

(3)    “woman” means a female of any age

(AP continuing): To change the definition of ‘man’ from ‘male of any age’ to ‘person who identifies as a man’ (or equivalent for the definition of woman) would impact on this legislation. It would detach the term ‘woman’ from ‘female’ and therefore also from ‘sex’; ‘sex’ would no longer refer to anything

Abi: Sounds good to me, though I don't see how this enables employers and what not to discriminate based on their perception of a subordinate’s sex. Can you explain the logistic changes to your own life?

AP: What sounds good you seem to be asking, ‘How does anyone an employer say know what another person’s sex is?’ Is that what you are asking?

AP: And yet we began with recognising that sex is a target for discrimination, which justifies a law to protect against such discrimination. Sex matters.

Abi: But it's the perception of sex that drives the discriminatory behaviour and what people are protected against. If sex became mere incidental history, like race, rather than a legally enforced caste, this would make it harder to justify sex-based discrimination.

AP: It would, I agree. If ‘sex’ is *not*, I can be neither discriminated against or selected on grounds of my sex. I don't believe ‘sex’ is ‘mere incidental history’. I can't conceive of human relations, which comprise history, that do not contend with sex- a condition of human life.

Abi: It doesn't really though, because sex-based discrimination is driven by perception of sex as much as, if not even more than, the “fact” of it.

AP: How can there be perception of sex without some background notion of sex so that we can say it is what we perceive? Why use quote marks around ‘fact’? Does not have to be either/or, as Jane Clare Jones points out in discussion of Judith Butler's account of sex as constructed.

(Screenshot from Jane Clare Jones online essay, ‘Judith Butler: How to disappear Patriarchy in Three Easy Steps’)

  

"As she [Judith Butler] argues in Bodies That Matter, the “moderate critic might concede that some part of ‘sex’ is constructed, but some other is certainly not, and then, of course, find… herself…under some obligation to draw the line between what is and is not constructed.” (11) This is the bit I dispute. There is no obligation to draw a line, either precisely around ‘sex’ or precisely around ‘woman,’ in order for these to be meaningful terms that do work in the world. Thinking that we have to draw lines around concepts for them to be meaningful is exactly the same old essentialist, spatializing, phallic rubbish that we should be critiquing. As Wittgenstein once usefully noted, we do not have to be able to point at the line on the floor where ‘here’ becomes ‘there’ in order to use these words with sense. Because essences and clear delineations and phallic oppositions are not the only – or most important – way that concepts work (if they are actually how they work at all)." (Jane Clare Jones, blog-post ‘Judith Butler: How to disappear Patriarchy in Three Easy Steps’)


Abi: How can there be perception of Race without some background notion of what Race is? And yet Race is a biological fiction imposed upon bodies with perceivable traits. Ending enforced race class is a step forward in anti-racism, not a step back. The same will be true for sex.

(And to get it out of the way before you even ask, Rachel Dolezal fails as a comparison to trans because race “transition” only works in one direction: white to non-white. Whereas half of all trans people are assigned female at birth so those gender transitions are also suppressed and surveilled.)

AP: Perhaps too, it is not necessary to be either/or about race?

Abi: Who is either-or-ing? I'm not the one suggesting we can only have sex or gender identity but not both.

AP: You are. You are saying ‘sex’ or ‘race’ is either fact or ‘biological fiction’/’mere incidental history’, and you come down on the latter. Why not ‘both/and’ (the point I think which is made by JC Jones)?

Abi: It really isn't that difficult a concept. Yes, biological differences exist. Yes, those differences often require different medical and practical accommodations. No, they should not be held against anybody. No way, should we enforce bio differences as mandated legal identities. In fact, I believe that very enforcement is what enshrines essential stereotypes against subordinated groups into law, the culture and all our institutions. Race, Sex, Dis/Ability have all been legislated and enforced in ways that reify those oppressions.

Abi: As for the quote, it's been a long time since I read Butler, so I have no way of knowing the context of the original quote being picked apart. So, pause. The biological fiction, to clarify, is the way we insist in Culture and in Law that because bio differences exist, we can infer a different class of person who is similar in character to others with the same bio traits, and fundamentally dissimilar to anyone else without them.   END


Wednesday, 13 October 2021

“You’re erasing me” - hyperbole of gender ideologues

Opposition to introducing 'gender identity' in UK law is being mounted, which also challenges the philosophy supporting it, philosophical ‘deconstruction’.

Deconstruction, as it has manifested in gender ideology, not just poor philosophy but nihilism; the same kind of maligning of human life which led intelligent people to hold, a number of years ago (and which many people still hold), that consciousness is ‘in fact’ the brain operating which gives only an illusion of agency, so that 'I', 'my self', am an illusion

In academia, in ‘gender studies’, there is only language, and the subject (the self) is constituted by language. But in gender ideology, the ideas pushed by activists, ‘gender’ is also an innate quality (an essence) which is located in the body/brain, which can be mis-aligned with the sexed body. According to this ideology, a person can be ‘born in the wrong body’ and undergo ‘the wrong puberty’, which will bring about that person’s deep misery and risk of suicide. Everyone is pressurised to accept this story by that threat of suicide.

It’s important to not be intimidated by that threat, to accept this false and damaging ideology. Don’t allow the trans-perbole of ‘you’re killing trans people’ to intimidate you into accepting the ideology.

In the last two days a website has been online presenting an Open Letter in support of Sussex University’s stand for academic freedom.

https://openlettertosussexfromukphilosophers.wordpress.com/

The letter has signatories from many academics across the UK, many from senior positions in established and well-regarded universities.


I have seen Twitter reactions from people supporting and people against what is contained in the letter. Many statements I have seen in Twitter are of the kind: “This letter supports a university defending a person [Kathleen Stock] who is campaigning to erase trans women / is a fascist and therefore the signatories are also fascist”.

Here is a screenshot of an example of an exchange in one Twitter thread, responding to the open letter and signatories. The first tweet / reply is from someone who apparently fears that trans people are threatened with being ‘erased’.

(Another reaction, to the Sussex University / Kathleen Stock situation, considers the question of whether a document which Kathleen Stock has endorsed, the ‘Declaration of Women’s Sex-Based Rights’

[see https://www.womensdeclaration.com/en/declaration-womens-sex-based-rights-full-text/ ]

is - in respect of ‘transgender’ - “eliminationist” and “genocidal”. I refer to British-US academic Grace Lavery’s blog-post, https://grace.substack.com/p/the-uk-media-has-seriously-bungled?fbclid=IwAR2kYnVhneR2qjYUjadKZGW3gprtD0Dh_EjH-kPaBB6NcpqKIhwSM82SXsA)

(A BBC statement was given on Politics Live after a student claimed the DWSR “wants to eliminate trans people in law”. The BBC statement, read out on Politics Live, stated that it was Kathleen Stock’s view that the “declaration does not amount to the claim that trans people should be eliminated in law” - quotation from the BBC statement. The Grace Lavery article considers whether or not this “elimination” is implied. I want to discuss subjective erasure, or subjective ‘elimination’, - that’s why I am referring to this here).


It’s been remarked that many of the signatories to the letter above represent British “analytic philosophy”, and I understand that Professor Stock is someone who works in that tradition, that she is an 'analytic philosopher'.

In her paper presented to the UK Aristotelian Society in 2020, “What is Sexual Orientation?”, Professor Stock makes reference to the so-called ‘divide’ in modern western philosophy between so-called  ‘Analytical’ and so-called ‘Continental’ philosophy.


As highlighted in the screenshot from that paper, above, Stock makes clear that she cannot address, within the confines of that paper, the fundaments of that divide between philosophy traditions. The ‘divide’ is old (200+ years) and deep, although some philosophers see grounds for there to be a re-joining (Hans Johann Glock for example). (The topic has been discussed on BBC Radio 4 'In our time', which I recommend).

Anyway, the 'divide' in philosophy is, I think, a real divide and which is on display in this confrontation over claims for 'rights' of  people who identify as 'transgender' (and how they conflict with other rights and protections such as 'sex-based protections' already established in law) and the freedom to question the basis for these claims. It seems to me that the existential attitude of ‘Continental’ philosophy collides fully in this issue. Language as thought of in Continental philosophy, that is, as ‘constitutive’ of ‘self’, is running up against language as thought of in Analytic philosophy, that is, as a kind of ‘tool’, made up of ‘concepts’. 

The difference between these attitudes is profound, and to adopt one attitude and or the other can, I think, be experienced as a kind of nullification of self. (I have experienced that myself, more of which below). Maybe temperament decides for a person if they like the ‘Analytic’ approach or the ‘Continental’ approach.

Mary Midgley was a philosopher trained in the Analytic mode at Oxford University in the 1940s. I think her writing is a great resource for addressing this present issue. Her last book (2017) is called “Are you an illusion?”, which explores the massive sense of subjective erasure which arises when it is claimed - by people in academia, who command popular respect and exert powerful influence - that our very consciousness is reducible to the activity of 'matter'/brains, so that what we think of as our Agency, and our free will, is illusory. This was a line being persistently and loudly proclaimed - mostly in the US - by philosophers such as Patricia Churchland, whose school of thought even earned a name: ‘eliminative materialism’. (The ‘eliminative’ is instructive here, I think!) Indeed it is a doctrine which ‘eliminates’ something (i.e. Agency) which people hold very dear to themselves as who they are in this world. The parallel is clear, I hope, with the sense that people speak of, when they say that ‘Trans people are threatened with being erased’. The feeling of erasure is because (is it not?) the concept of ‘gender identity’ is being questioned, is being criticised.

Stemming from a tradition in philosophy (the ‘Continental’ tradition) in which the idea of ‘essences’ is challenged, such that all we take to be 'essential' is in fact ‘linguistic’, ‘gender’ is - on one hand - regarded as a matter of ‘performed’ ‘citations’ of previous ‘gender’ ‘presentations’, all understood, more or less, as kinds of language; and language is 'constitutive' of 'self' (or, of 'identity', possibly). There is no ‘essence’ of ‘gender’ in this approach. But this appears to be at complete loggerheads with, on the other hand, the notion of an innate  ‘gender identity’, free-floating from language. The ‘self’ is either ‘constituted’ by language or it is prior to, and grounded somewhere outside of, language: ‘extra-‘ or ‘pre-‘ ‘discursive’. It can’t be both. The ideas are incompatible and mutually exclusive.

But (bizarrely in contradiction to any post-structuralist writing I am aware of, where ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ are discussed, and which theories are the origins of this rigid dogma) innate ‘gender identity’ is posited as the neurological condition for ‘gender dysphoria’ to occur, such that medical intervention is required - as a matter of expert medical opinion, repeated in many activist presentations - to ‘adjust’ the body to conform to the ‘identity’. (See, for example, YouTube conversation between Meghan Murphy and Julie Rei Goldstein https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-yawM1CRWxE). If the concept of ‘innate’ ‘gender identity’ is questioned, so is the basis for Medicine to retain its claims to expert status and privileged position from which to pronounce on ‘gender-affirmative care’, such as is on display in WPATH’s statement in response to Abigail Shrier’s recent interview with WPATH member Marci Bowers MD.

https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/Public%20Policies/2021/Joint%20WPATH%20USPATH%20Letter%20Dated%20Oct%2012%202021.pdf

A very popular Marxist (‘Continental’) philosopher Slavoj Zizek has spoken about this 'gender essentialism'.

_________

It does not perturb the post-structuralist-inspired political disrupters of norms (‘enforced heterosexuality’ or whatever) that essentialisms like ‘neurologically-based’ or ‘biologically-based’ ‘gender’ are given, because they know these arguments are diverted down cul-de-sacs of ‘what the science says’, ‘what is objectively true’, ‘what science shows to be true’. The reason is that these political disrupters of norms can point to ‘intersectional’ feminism, and feminist theories such as Standpoint Epistemology, which regards itself as having rendered science an arbitrary framework, which is justifiably set aside or un-learned on grounds that it is Patriarchal, hetero-sexist, or whatever. (The self-described ‘recovering Logical Positivist’ Prof. Sandra Harding is one of the US academics behind Standpoint Theory. So far as I can tell, this theory - like so many others influencing institutions today- has emerged from a distinctly American-empiricist and instrumentalisibg uptake of French post-structuralism.

This instrumentalising attitude within US academia, seems to have been noticed and commented on by Jacques Derrida, a French post-structuralist philosopher, who taught in the US. In this YouTube clip he is questioned by an American journalist on comments he had made about this, and he is presented, in the very stance of the journalist, with an example.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2j578jTBCY

What a pity Harding could not have opted - in her critique of Positivism - for the non-foundationalism of Karl Popper, as celebrated by Malachi Hacohen, instead of the radical subjectivism and idealism to which she seems to have turned). 

With a few exceptions, you will not hear a post-structuralist philosopher decry philosophical essentialism deployed in these political arguments, I suspect because they know on which side their bread is buttered. Philosophical Idealism suits them very much, because it serves tbe creation of an enclosed system within academia, where abstruse questions are turned over by cognoscenti who only have ears and eyes for each other, and while the population at large is subject to all manner of tyranny of their ideas, passed down by an indoctrinated bureaucracy, installed for the benefit of its own existence.

______________

One of Mary Midgley’s ideas - I recall it from one of the last interviews she gave before she died - is that our emotions can and should be controlled by our intellect. In the face of feeling ‘erased’ by an idea, what else is there to do except try to come to terms with the fact that it is an idea which is causing this pain? Letting go of an idea that has gripped us is painful, and we might prefer to continue to act in the world so the idea is upheld, is realised! Is it a good idea? 

I am reminded of a film: “Come and see!”, set in Poland (I think) during WW2. A young Polish man witnesses the worst atrocities of Fascism and Nazism in his country, and at the last moment - as he is about to kill and become a killer - he recognises the human being that is, and has been, in the grip of a pernicious and evil idea, and decides to (metaphorically) “Kill the Hitler” in himself. The idea dies. He succeeds to 'Kill the Hitler' in himself and spares himself and the world (the other person). 

If people reading don’t know about the ‘divide’ and what it entails in history, I recommend anything by UK philosopher Andrew Bowie; a short book ‘Continental Philosophy’ by UK philosopher Simon Critchley, and the (still, to my mind) amazing pair of essays by John Stuart Mill exploring the limits of Utilitarianism: ‘Bentham’ (1836) and ‘Coleridge’ (around the same date).

Criticisms of 'gender identity' are expressed from within academic discourse, which question an idea implied in a doctrine also generated within academia. 

Saturday, 2 October 2021

Men talking abt women’s demand for end to VAWG

 I was listening just now to @Mara_Yamauchi ‘s contribution to BBC Radio 5 Live ‘Breakfast Show’ (1st October 2021, starting at 1hr 08mins), discussing what men can do to bring about a world in which women are, and women feel, more safe from male violence.


https://t.co/30V5Gc4WbS?amp=1


Nicky Campbell (Radio 5 host) asked of Mara: what can men do?, and he picked up on Mara’s comment, that she had chosen to drive rather than take the train and walk home at night, after going out, because that felt safer.

Nicky Campbell asked ‘So, for example, if I see you running [Mara is an athlete] towards me, do I cross the road?’

To which Mara replied (I am paraphrasing), ‘Yes, you could make space by stepping into the road’. 


Mara went on to make some reasonable connections with the impact of certain so-called ‘inclusive’ (i.e. ‘trans-inclusive’) language which means that the word ‘woman’ is being dropped out of discourse in favour of terms like ‘body with a vagina’. I think the point was that such language is de-humanising, it invites thinking of persons as somehow independent of their bodies, and that very deliberate divorcing of mind / person and body, so to speak, is relevant to this conversation about women’s experiences and male VAWG. I think this is a very reasonable point.


But what I am writing about here, is what the Radio 5 exchange reminded me of, as I listened.


After Sarah Everard was (as we now know fully, and to our horror) abducted and murdered, there was a vigil held on Clapham Common to memorialise Sarah.


I was living quite near Clapham at the time, tho I didn’t attend the vigil.


One evening quite soon after the vigil, I engaged in a conversation with a co-occupant of mine in the multi-occupancy house where I lived. We are both male, in later middle age - our childhoods were the 1970s and 1980s.


The conversation was about the reactions to Sarah Everard’s killing, and the vigil, on social media, which was, understandably, a huge protest against violence against women, and appeals (as there are now again, after Sarah’s killer’s sentencing) for men to participate, adjust, challenge behaviours which objectify women, to think and act differently.


This conversation followed many others we had had on socio-political issues driving the pandemic year 2020, with all the massive upheaval and reaction not only to the virus but also to the murder of George Floyd in Minneapolis, USA, and other events.


Well, my neighbour was unhappy about the social media reaction, which he regarded as having crossed over into being anti-men. There was apparently a grievance about the tone it had taken, which I understood (and put back to him, by way of a question, to check is this was right).


I sensed something like a #NAMALT reaction, which is a common reaction from a man, when he becomes defensive in the face of a *general charge being made towards or about men*, in general. 


“It is difficult”, I said - or tried to say, “to listen to statements of that sort” (meaning the general charges made about men, and demands for men to change) “and to not take them too personally, but to recognise the position of the women making them”.


It is a sensitive and difficult subject to talk about, but I tried to understand more of what he was getting at, by asking him what he thought had made the social media conversation go too far. 


We then began to consider hypothetical situations, like walking along a street, and being conscious of a lone woman approaching. What do we do?


As we talked, I became aware of what seemed to be his feeling of affront with the suggestion that he make space for a women on the pavement by stepping into the road (‘into the gutter’).


(This is what had been mentioned in the exchange I have just listened to, between Mara Yamauchi and Nicky Campbell, on Radio 5).


It was a consequence of my quite gentle (I thought) challenge, that the conversation then turned into something that was more about what was going on *between us two men*.


Because his opening to the conversation was something like, that a general charge was being made of men - unfairly, going too far, and he felt - so I understood - something like #NAMALT.


I think, looking back, that he had an expectation that I would agree with him, but I did not immediately agree. Knowing what I know of myself, and something of this person’s style of engagement and presentation, which was frequently with a sort of ‘typical’ male aggressiveness - e.g., things said with an expectation of the listener’s assent, speaking loudly, standing rather than sitting, etc. 


So in my challenging - which was really only a questioning, and a desire to *not simply give assent* - to look at and consider examples of what we do, how we do, in fact, react to encountering a lone woman - the conversation became about the relation *between us two men*, and something emerged about what he felt was proper, or appropriate, in principle, for us two men - and ‘therefore ALL men’ - in relating to women. 


The matter of ‘stepping into the gutter’ now took on a different meaning. It was not a simple, practical thing that could help to make a woman feel safer, as it perhaps was thought of in Nicky Campbell’s question to Mara.

Now the conversation between us two men had slipped into being *about* us two men, and how we behave, which might make us the same, or different. Now ‘stepping into the road’/‘stepping into the gutter’ was presented by my neighbour as a demeaning thing, and an injury to a his (therefore ‘all men’s’)  pride.


This is how the conversation went.


It became a matter of pride, and being proud as a ‘manly attribute’ and therefore a desirable attribute to have *as a man*.


In the conversation, as he became closer to his real feelings of manliness (sort of rising to his own emotion) my neighbour, a man in late middle age, was communicating that he liked to have *the capacity to be intimidating* (to signal a potential for being violent) to men and women. It was a source of good feeling in himself, that he he can present himself like that. In our conversation, as I asked him, if he took umbrage at the suggestion that he might step into the road, he switched from thinking about the woman’s safety (the hypothetical encounter) to how he wanted things to be between us, and how he wanted me to think about him, and he communicated, quite clearly, how being able to show this intimidating aspect was part of who he was, and this was intended to be intimidating *to me*.


I could see that talking things out further was not in my interests and would probably only serve to make his tone more defensive in relation to me, and to go nowhere with respect to thinking about the social media reaction, or to thinking about women and safety.


He was, in fact, intimidating to me. And that was the point.

And that was the point when I decided to break off the conversation. 


This is what it can be like between men, when seeking to challenge something in another man’s behaviour or speech that sounds ‘everyday’ sexist or #NAMALT.

Thursday, 1 July 2021

Gender-identity ideology is trans-humanism is anti-humanism

Self-congratulatory theoretical constructions, inimical to human flourishing.

I find no positive vision of human life, in the doctrine of ‘gender identity’ and ‘gender self-identification’. It takes for granted that things that lend meaning to our names ‘man’ ‘woman’, ‘boy’ ‘girl’, ‘mother’ ‘father’, will persist, even while it detached itself from what, I believe, are the material conditions of human life, which are the sources of that meaning: infancy; absolute need of infants for love and dependence on care-givers (parents) for it; sex; parenthood; death.

https://thepointmag.com/criticism/when-nothing-is-cool/

Meanwhile, here is a recent example of legal commentary inflected by this nihilistic anti-human intellectualism.

Alex Sharpe, a professor and legal scholar in UK, has posted an article entitled ‘“Not a Nazi...But”: Forstater vs. CGD’,  on the website ‘critical legal thinking.com’ (CLT).

https://criticallegalthinking.com/

The article considers an example of a philosophical belief offered by the judge in the appeal tribunal case above, which would *fail* ‘Grainger 5’ (one of the five tests for whether a belief qualifies as a ‘philosophical belief’ which would be protected under the Equality Act 2010). The example the judge gave, was (as quoted in Prof Sharpe’s article): 

‘“a belief that all non-white people should be forcibly deported for the good of the nation”, any manifestation of which would be “highly likely to espouse hatred and incitement to violence.”’


This belief would, says Judge Choudhury - the judge at the employment appeal tribunal (in Forstater’s appeal case), fail Grainger 5 and thereby be counted as *not* worthy of respect in a democratic society.


To Prof Sharpe, this example of a belief that would *not* attain the status of protected philosophical belief, “does not seem fundamentally different to the claimant’s [Forstater’s] belief ‘trans women are male’”.


That’s where Prof Sharpe feels justified in using the title “Not a Nazi ... But”.


Prof Sharpe presupposes, takes it as a basic premise, that the class of ‘women‘ comprises two groups: “cis” women and “trans” women, whose membership of this class, and of these groups, is according to the individual’s innate, psychological state called ‘gender identity’. In this theoretical view, ‘sex’, as a basis for membership of the class ‘women’ and ‘men’, whereby ‘men’ are adult human males and ‘women’ are adult human females, is *disappeared*. This account of the classes of ‘men’ and ‘women’ is simply assumed by Professor Sharpe, and not stated openly (at least in this article it is not) and not argued for. It is taken as given that ‘sex’, and ‘male’ and ‘female’, no longer have the meanings that they have had, if they have any meaning at all.


After which, Prof Sharpe wants us to believe that when ‘gender’ is recognised to be part of language and culture, and ‘sex’ (and the male/female sex difference) is recognised to be a fundamental condition of life, this threatens the “existence” of “trans people”.

Thus Prof Sharpe likens this belief to Nazism.


This is idea-ism quite out of touch with human reality. 


To recognise ‘sex’, and sex-difference, as a condition of life, and as the basis for membership of the classes ‘men’ and ‘women’, excludes the abstract-theoretical, imposed division of ‘cis’/‘trans’, and excludes membership of the class according to self-declared ‘gender identity’.

It excludes, i.e. it is fundamentally incompatible with, the ideological premises adopted by Prof Sharpe. But where, in this, does Prof Sharpe’s “existence” (as a trans person) occur, or become threatened?

It is the *ideas* and the *language* which are opposed and denied.


Freud and Marx (taken as representing bodies of thought) are fundamentally incompatible.

We don’t say that Psychoanalysis threatens the existence of socialists, because we are not ideologically hidebound. We are not committed to one, and only one, universal account of the world.


But in the past, ideologically hidebound people, who were Marxists, did kill (and died) for their beliefs. 


I would say, Prof Sharpe is bound to one view, a highly theoretical view, of the world, or at least the (very important) part that deals with the human body, and apparently tolerates no other, except in so far as social life demands. I suppose it has been integral to their personal journey, as someone who transitioned to live as a woman, to hold that view of the world - the ‘self’ as constituted by language - so that to relinquish it feels like the end of that self. But it is an idea continuing to be believed in, it is the existence of the idea, which is threatened. That is what is at stake. Incompatible world views occur in philosophy, and in life. But theory (philosophy) is not life.


We avert actual Nazism by recognising theory to be - always - potentially wrong. 


Prof Sharpe’s article goes on to refer to the (as Judge Choudhury ruled) protected belief “trans women are male” as “de-humanising” and serves to “undermine human rights”.


As far as I can tell, the de-humanising tendency is all on the side of the philosophy which supports ‘cis’/‘trans’ and which denies ‘sex’ as a condition of life. 


It seems to me that this philosophy supposes persons to be independent of their bodies, so that their bodies are mere adjuncts to life and experience, which can be set aside in consideration of persons and the law. That seems to me to be a philosophy much more readily turned to actual Nazism, actual obliteration of bodies.


The problem with this philosophy is precisely its trans-humanism, which is its anti-humanism. It purports to be for human rights, even while it is clearly of a piece with trans-humanism: the desire of some humans to dispense altogether with corporeality, and in that sense, escape being human altogether.


Consider this passage from a 2015 lecture given at Durham University by Dr Rowan Williams, a veteran of the ten-year-long (2006-16) rumpus over the so-called ‘New Atheism’ (of Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris et al):


“[RW refers to ‘The History Manifesto’, 2014, by Cambridge university historians Jo Guldi and David Armitage, which posits that] the thinning-out of historical knowledge in general ... [means] that we now have an impatience of understanding of how we got here.

If we don’t know how we got here, we will tend to assume that where we are is obvious; if we assume that where we are is obvious, we are less likely to ask critical questions about it; the less likely we are to ask critical questions about it, the more resistant we will be to others challenges to it. In other words, not understanding how we learned to be the people we now are, has an immediate and highly dangerous effect on the kind of society we are and might seek to be, just as it would have a dangerous effect on any one of us, who wished to block out the memory of the experiences that, as a matter of fact, have made us the people we are.


That learning, Dr Williams goes on to remind us, inevitably and deeply involves the body. It is what enables empathic connection, and thereby compassion, into our relating, to ourselves and to others.


A mental willing is manifested in the theoretical notions of ‘gender identity’ and ‘gender self-declaration’, which separates mind and body. It enacts the kind of historical forgetting which Dr Williams talks about here, and which is, I think, active in the philosophy behind Professor Sharpe’s words.


Compare Dr Williams lecture to this, from Sarah Ditum in 2018. (I’m mindful that anything emanating from the Church, from Christianity or anyone associated with it is immediately cast as being, not only conservative, but ‘alt-right’ or ‘far-right’ and anathema, and feminism - whether it is liberal-‘intersectional’ or ‘radical’-materialist, is keen to distance itself from religion. But I see distinct sympathies of thinking between what some feminist critics of ‘gender identity’ ideology have to say, and what was frequently said, including by people of religion, including Dr Williams, in challenging the ‘New Atheism’ of 2006-16).


We are our bodies, our intelligence exists in every nerve, and the idea that a feeling of “being female” would mean anything in the absence of a female body was, I knew, intrinsically absurd.


Learning, and knowledge, is situated not in isolated brains, self-identifying, but in bodies. Persons and their bodies.

Any engaged reading of serious accounts of ‘gender identity’ will reveal the irreconcilable  contradictions: ‘it’s in the neutrons’; ‘it’s historical-linguistic, as are all human categories’. These both can’t be true.



References:

‘Being human’: lectures by Dr Rowan Williams, former arch-bishop of Canterbury, includes

‘Tree of knowledge: Bodies, Minds, Thoughts’

https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/videos/dr-rowan-williams-tree-knowledge-bodies-minds-and-thoughts


‘6 years in the gender wars’, Sarah Ditum

https://sarahditum.com/2018/09/10/six-years-in-the-gender-wars/


‘The divorce between the sciences and the humanities’, Isaiah Berlin.

Anything by Stefan Collini.

Introductory lectures on the theory of literature, Paul Fry (Yale University).

‘Popper: the early years’, Malachi Hacohen.

‘Fairy Tales’, the Grimm brothers.

‘Notes on some schizoid mechanisms’ Melanie Klein.